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Abstract Bilinguals often display reduced emo-
tional resonance their second language (L2) and
therefore tend to be less prone to decision-making
biases in their L2 (e.g., Costa et al. in Cognition
130(2):236–254, 2014a, PLoS One 9(4):1–7,
2014b)—a phenomenon coined Foreign Language
Effect (FLE). The present pre-registered experiments
investigated whether FLE can mitigate a special case
of cognitive bias, called optimality bias, which occurs
when observers erroneously blame actors for making
‘‘suboptimal’’ choices, even when there was not
sufficient information available for the actor to
identify the best choice (De Freitas and Johnson in J
Exp Soc Psychol 79:149–163, 2018. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jesp.2018.07.011). In Experiment 1, L1
English speakers (N = 63) were compared to L2
English speakers from various L1 backgrounds
(N = 56). In Experiment 2, we compared Finnish
bilinguals completing the study in either Finnish (L1,
N = 103) or English (L2, N = 108). Participants read a
vignette describing the same tragic outcome resulting
from either an optimal or suboptimal choice made by a
hypothetical actor with insufficient knowledge. Their
blame attributions were measured using a 4-item scale.
A strong optimality bias was observed; participants
assigned significantly more blame in the suboptimal
choice conditions, despite being told that the actor did
not know which choice was best. However, no clear
interaction with language was found. In Experiment 1,
bilinguals gave reliably higher blame scores than
natives. In Experiment 2, no clear influence of target
language was found, but the results suggested that the
FLE is actually more detrimental than helpful in the
domain of blame attribution. Future research should
investigate the benefits of emotional involvement in
blame attribution, including factors such as empathy
and perspective-taking.
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Introduction
The foreign language effect (FLE) suggests that the
tendency of bilingual speakers to experience less
emotional involvement in their second language (L2)
can lead to a reduction in cognitive biases (e.g., Keysar
et al. 2012). This means that when using their L2,
bilinguals may be able to engage in more rational
thinking, which in turn may lead to a reduction of
typical biases in decision-making or moral judgment.
Evidence for the FLE has been provided for a
number of different cognitive biases. For example, it
has been found that the FLE may reduce superstitious
belief (Hadjichristidis et al. 2019). Bilingual partici-
pants in this study were asked to rate how bad or good
they would feel about doing an action (such as
applying for a job) in different ‘‘good luck’’ and
‘‘bad luck’’ scenarios. It was found that reading the
scenarios in their L2 prompted more neutral feelings
towards good versus bad luck scenarios. The FLE has
also been found to mitigate causality illusions in a
contingency learning task, where people falsely
believe that two events are related (Diaz-Lago and
Matute 2018).
Most of the research on the FLE has been conducted
in the context of decision-making. For instance,
Keysar et al. (2012) investigated the loss-aversion
bias, i.e. whether the way a decision-making dilemma
is framed affects how participants choose to respond to
it (see also Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Their
participants were presented with a hypothetical sce-
nario in which 600,000 people were exposed to a
deadly disease. The participants were presented with
two choices of medicine, one of which was a ‘‘sure’’
option (A) and one of which was a ‘‘risky’’ option (B).
In the gain frame condition, participants were told that
a choosing medicine A will save 200,000 lives, whilst
if they choose medicine B, there is a 33.3% chance that
600,000 people will be saved and 66.6% chance that
no one will be saved. In the loss frame condition, they
were told that choosing medicine A will cost the lives
of 400,000, whilst with medicine B, there is a 33.3%
chance that no one will die, and a 66.6% chance that
600,000 people will die. Hence, the outcomes were
identical in both framing conditions—however, par-
ticipant’s choices were not. They were more likely to
choose the ‘‘risky’’ medicine (B) if the outcome was
framed in terms of loss rather than gain—in other
words, a clear framing effect was found. Crucially,
being presented the dilemma in one’s L2 mitigated this
bias. These findings have also been replicated by Costa
et al. (2014a) on a number of similar framing
problems. They suggested that using L2 reduces loss
aversion because it mutes the emotional involvement
of participants.
In an investigation of utilitarian judgements, Costa
et al. (2014b) studied the classic ‘footbridge dilemma’,
and found bilinguals participating in their L2 were
more likely to opt for (hypothetically) pushing one
individual off a bridge to save the lives of five others.
They argued that due to reduced emotionality in L2,
the emotional compromise of harming one individual
does not interfere with the rational decision of saving
more lives. Further research has found that the effect
emerges for the ‘footbridge dilemma’, but not the
‘trolley dilemma’, which involves pushing a button to
sacrifice an individual, instead of actively harming the
individual (Cipolletti et al. 2015; Geipel et al. 2015).
Emotionality of the decision-making scenario pre-
sented seems to be an important mediator. Using one’s
second language only seems to mitigate the bias for
more emotional and morally compromising hypothet-
ical situations; for example, those involving actively
pushing a person to their death. Corey et al. (2017)
replicated this effect over several experiments, and
found that the FLE was stronger in personal dilemmas,
as opposed to impersonal ones. Importantly, it was
also found that the effect decreased if emotionality
was diminished by manipulating the severity of
consequences, e.g. death vs. disability vs. injury.
Thus, the FLE appears to be stronger in more
emotional contexts, which supports a strong link to
reduced emotional resonance in one’s second
language.
Little research so far has focused on whether the
FLE also affects judgements about other people, in
particular attributions. Attribution is defined as the
process of assigning cause and meaning to the actions
of others and/or phenomena in the world around us
(e.g., Alicke et al. 2015). Previous research on
attribution suggests that people often fail to provide
unbiased judgements. One well-known attribution
bias, for example, is the fundamental attribution
error: people are prone to attribute their own mistakes
to environmental factors, whilst attributing mistakes
made by others to dispositional factors (e.g., Ross
1977). More recently, however, some theorists argued
that this divide between ‘person’ vs. ‘environment’ is
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too simplistic, as it fails to address the complex
reasons behind responsibility, such as intervening
causes, failure to act, or previous failed attempts
(Alicke et al. 2015).
The aspect of emotion has also been incorporated
into attribution theory. According to the ‘person-as-
reconstructor’ theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1982;
Kahneman and Miller 1986), psychological reactions
to an event are reconstructed after the event. Tragic
outcomes produce strong affective reactions, which
motivate observers to reconstruct the event and look
towards alternative choices. An actor may be blamed
for failing to act differently, even when the outcome
was not foreseeable to the actor. Similarly, the ‘person
as moralist’ theory (Alicke et al. 2011; Mandel 2010)
argues for a bidirectional relationship between cause
and blame. The theory suggests that assessing an
actor’s causal role becomes conflated with the
observer’s emotional responses. Factors like negative
perceptions of an actor, or negative consequences of
an action, can therefore influence blame attribution to
some extent.
According to the optimality principle, observers
assume that people are rational and strive to make the
best possible decision in a complex and competitive
environment (Schoemaker 1991). This principle is
often problematic when judging other people (Toda
1991), specifically given that observers are hardly able
to account for the many unknown variables that can
affect the actions of others. This can lead to a
discrepancy between perceived intention and beha-
viour, and failure to realise that ‘good intentions’ may
not necessarily lead to ‘good outcomes’ (or vice
versa). In other words, observers often fail to recog-
nise the simple fact that people are fallible and make
mistakes, and that optimality cannot always be
achieved.
A recent study has offered a novel application of
this concept, by studying optimality bias in moral
judgements (De Freitas and Johnson 2018). The
authors argued that suboptimal choices or actions
made by others are difficult to understand, because
people are always expected to behave optimally, even
in situations where they do not have full control.
Consequently, actors making suboptimal decisions
will elicit more pronounced affective reactions in
observers, and thus be subject to more severe moral
judgements.
In a series of experiments (De Freitas and Johnson
2018), participants were presented with different
vignettes, each describing a scenario where an actor
must choose between three different alternatives, e.g.,
a doctor having to choose between three different
treatments for a patient with hearing problems.
Unbeknown to the described actor, the three options
had different degrees of optimality. The vignettes
always explicitly stated that the actor thought that all
options were of equal efficacy, while in fact they had
statistically different success rates. Regardless of the
described actor’s decision, the vignettes always
described the same tragic outcome (e.g., the patient
suffering from permanent hearing loss after treat-
ment). Participants were randomly allocated to con-
ditions in which the actor made either the best, middle,
or worst decision from an objective, omniscient
perspective. It was found that actors who made the
best choice were assigned significantly less blame than
those in either of the two suboptimal conditions. This
effect emerged despite the fact that all decisions were
made in the same (hypothetical) context of insufficient
knowledge, and that each type of decision produced
the same negative outcome. The authors replicated
this effect across seven experiments with different
manipulations, including varying the consequences of
the action and the degree of explanation regarding the
actor’s intentions. De Freitas and Johnson (2018)
concluded that the most important factor in this bias is
the tendency to ignore the actor’s mental state, i.e., to
expect them to behave optimally even when this is not
possible from the actor’s point of view.
To date, there is hardly any research on linguistic
background as a potential mediating factor in attribu-
tion biases, despite the wide-ranging implications such
biases may have on social judgements in general, and
the previously discussed foreign language effect
(FLE) findings in particular. The present paper is a
first attempt at bridging this gap by exploring whether
the FLE modulates the optimality bias in blame
attribution. Specifically, we aim to replicate De Freitas
and Johnson’s (2018) work with slight modifications
to the design. More specifically, we investigate
whether the optimality bias in blame attribution is
mitigated by the FLE. The original experiments had
three levels of optimality (best, middle, worst), but
found no significant difference between the two sub-
optimal conditions. As we are adding a target language
123
J Cult Cogn Sci
manipulation to our designs (L1 vs. L2), we will
include only two levels of optimality.
In the following, we will report two separate
experiments. The first experiment compares optimal-
ity bias across two speaker groups (native [L1] vs.
non-native [L2] speakers of English) using vignette
materials in English. The second experiment compares
the effect across two target languages (Finnish [L1] vs.
English [L2]) within a population of Finnish–English
bilinguals.
In line with the original study, we expect that
participants should ascribe more blame for a negative
outcome to a hypothetical actor who unknowingly
chooses the worst course of action (suboptimal
condition) than to a hypothetical actor who unknow-
ingly chooses the best course of action (optimal
condition). We expect this to happen even though
(a) the consequences of the choice are equally negative
and (b) the actor is described as having insufficient
information in each case. More crucially, under the
assumption that this effect is mitigated by the FLE, we
also expect an interaction between condition and
target language. Specifically, as a result of reduced
emotional involvement in L2, we predict that there
should be a reliably weaker optimality bias in blame
judgements when participants are tested in their
second language (L2), compared to when they are
tested in their native language (L1).
Method
Pre-registration
Hypotheses (see above), methods, and analyses (indi-
cated in the results section) were pre-registered on the
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/arx3u).
Participants
Three groups of participants were recruited across the
two experiments; a native English-speaking monolin-
gual group, a bilingual Finnish–English group, and a
bilingual group that consisted of native speakers of
various languages with English as their L2. All
participants resided in the United Kingdom at the
time of taking part in the experiment. In both
experiments, bilingual participants were asked to fill
out a questionnaire regarding their language
background (see ‘‘Appendix A’’). Bilingual partici-
pants were defined as speakers who are fluent in their
native language and in English as their second
language. Bilingual participants who reported having
learned English before the age of six and/or having
native English speaking parents were not included in
the final sample. This cut-off point was chosen to
exclude ‘early bilinguals’, i.e. participants who have
learnt English from early childhood and/or in a home
setting. Participant samples and further exclusion
criteria per experiment are described in more detail in
the following sub-sections.
In Experiment 1, an initial sample of 186 partici-
pants was recruited through convenience sampling on
social media. Of these, 25 were excluded for having
incomplete datasets due to technical problems in
online data transfer. Another 17 were excluded for
incorrect answers to comprehension questions.
Finally, 25 were excluded from the bilingual subgroup
for learning English before the age of 6 or having
native-English parents. The final sample consisted of
119 participants, aged from 19 to 63 years
(M = 26.02, SD = 8.58). Of these, 56 were bilinguals
from various L1 language backgrounds, and 63 were
native English speakers. Ninety-one of the 119
participants identified themselves as female, 25 as
male, and 3 declined to reveal their gender. Table 1
provides a more detailed breakdown of the condition
counts and gender distributions in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, a sample of Finnish–English
bilinguals residing in the UK was recruited, again
through social media. Half of the participants com-
pleted the study in their native language (Finnish), and
half in their L2 (English). Of an initial set of 331
respondents, 59 gave incorrect answers to compre-
hension questions, and another 27 were excluded for
having learnt English before 6 years of age. Finally,
data sets from 34 respondents were incomplete and
thus removed. The final sample therefore included 211
participants, of whom 103 had been randomly
assigned to Finnish (L1) and 108 to English (L2) as
the target language for testing. Participants ranged in
age from 18 to 71 years (M = 36.05, SD = 11.72). Of
the final sample, 187 participants reported to be
female, 23 male, and one participant declined to reveal
their gender. Table 2 shows a more detailed break-
down of the condition counts and gender distributions
in Experiment 2.
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Bilingual participants’ reported age of English
acquisition was comparable across the two studies
(Experiment 1: M = 9.34 years; Experiment 2:
M = 9.21 years). Bilinguals in Experiment 1 reported
to have lived in the UK for 5.20 years on average.
Bilinguals in Experiment 2 reported a longer average
length of stay in the UK (9.7 years). For a full
breakdown of AoA and length of stay by experiment
and condition see Tables 3 and 4 below. Participants
were asked to rate their English (L2) proficiency in
terms of speaking, reading and writing on a scale from
1 ‘‘very poor’’ to 7 ‘‘excellent’’. After summing the
scores across the three sub-scales (speaking, reading,
and writing), self-assessed proficiency could range
from 3 (lowest) to 21 (highest). The mean self-
assessment scores were very high both in Experiment
1 (M = 18.93, SD = 2.59) and in Experiment 2
(M = 18.82, SD = 2.24). There was no reliable dif-
ference in self-assessed proficiency between the
bilingual groups in the two experiments (p = 0.62 by
Mann–Whitney U test). Within Experiment 2, the
bilingual subgroup who completed the task in English
was slightly (but not reliably, p = 0.092) higher in
self-assessed English proficiency (M = 19.07, SD =
2.28) than the subgroup who completed the task in
Finnish (M = 18.55, SD = 2.18).
Materials
Both studies were carried out online using Experi-
mentum, a platform for online surveys set up by the
University of Glasgow School of Psychology and
Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology. All mate-
rials used in the studies were available in both English
and Finnish. Finnish materials for Experiment 2 were
translated from English by a native Finnish (English
L2) speaker, and cross-translated by two other native
Finnish speakers (who currently reside in Finland) to
ensure compatibility.
The vignette used in the study was adapted from
Experiment 1 in De Freitas and Johnson (2018). The
original vignette included three levels of optimality
(‘‘best’’, ‘‘middle’’, ‘‘worst’’), but since the original
paper did not find a difference in blame between the
two suboptimal conditions, we decided to implement
only two choice conditions for the sake of simplicity.
The third (‘‘middle’’) option was still included in the
vignette in order not stray too much from original
setup, but only the ‘‘best’’ and the ‘‘worst’’ option were
used as choices made by the described actor
Table 1 Participant counts
and gender distribution per
condition in Experiment 1
Bilingual Native English
Optimal Suboptimal Optimal Suboptimal
N 30 26 36 27
%Male 30.00 23.08 16.67 14.81
%Female 70.00 73.08 77.78 85.19
%Other/not say 0 3.85 5.56 0
Table 2 Participant counts
and gender distribution per
condition in Experiment 2
Finnish (L1) English (L2)
Optimal Suboptimal Optimal Suboptimal
N 48 55 51 57
%Male 10.42 10.91 13.73 8.77
%Female 89.59 87.27 86.27 91.23
%Other/not say 0 1.82 0 0
Table 3 Bilinguals’ self-reported length of stay in the UK and
age of L2 acquisition (means and SDs in years), broken down
by condition for Experiment 1
Optimal Suboptimal
M SD M SD
Length of stay 6.01 5.18 4.15 3.60
AoA 8.97 2.51 9.77 4.33
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(manipulated conditions). The vignette was therefore
as follows:
A doctor working in a hospital has a patient who is
having hearing problems. This patient has three, and
only three, treatment options. The doctor believes that
all treatment options have a 70% chance of giving the
patient a full, successful recovery. But in fact, the
doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually:
1. If she gives the patient treatment LPN, there is a
70% chance that the patient will have a full
recovery.
2. If she gives the patient treatment PTY, there is a
50% chance the patient will have a full recovery.
3. If she gives the patient treatment NRW, there is a
30% chance the patient will have a full
recovery.
The doctor chooses treatment (LPN or NRW)
[manipulated between conditions], and the patient
does not recover at all. The patient now has permanent
hearing loss.
There were two versions of the vignette; in the
optimal condition the hypothetical doctor was
described to have chosen the ‘optimal’ treatment
(LPN, 70% efficacy) and in the suboptimal condition
the doctor had chosen the ‘suboptimal’ treatment
(NRW, 30% efficacy). In both cases, the doctor was
described as erroneously assuming equal efficacies of
the treatments. The described outcome remained the
same across conditions, with the hypothetical patient
suffering permanent hearing loss regardless of the
treatment that was administered.
A five-item ‘‘blame questionnaire’’ was designed to
measure participants’ responses to the narratives. The
responses were collected on 9-point Likert scales (cf.
De Freitas and Johnson 2018) ranging from 1 (low
blame) to 9 (high blame). The items addressed five
different aspects of the blame judgements: (1) how
much the doctor is to blame; (2) how much respon-
sibility the doctor had; (3) how much the doctor
deserved punishment; (4) how seriously wrong the
doctor’s decision was; and finally, (5) how confident
the participant was in making their judgement. The
last item (5) was not considered to be a direct measure
of blame attribution; it rather served as an additional
control metric. Full wordings of the relevant questions
can be found in ‘‘Appendix B’’. In addition, there were
three comprehension questions about the content of
the vignettes which were also taken from De Freitas
and Johnson (2018). Comprehension questions can
also be found in ‘‘Appendix B’’. Participants were
excluded if they gave wrong answers to either of the
first two of the comprehension questions. The third
comprehension question was not used as an exclusion
criterion, due to high numbers of participants answer-
ing this question incorrectly, regardless of target
language. However, this comprehension question was
included in exploratory analyses (see ‘‘Results’’
section).
Design and procedure
In Experiment 1, all participants completed the
experiment in English. We compared two groups of
participants (L1 vs. L2 speakers of English) in two
conditions (optimal vs. suboptimal) using a 2 9 2
between-subjects design. Assignment of participants
to experimental conditions (optimal vs suboptimal)
was determined at random. In Experiment 2, Finnish–
English bilinguals were tested in a 2 9 2 between-
subjects design crossing target language (Finnish [L1]
vs. English [L2]) with condition (optimal vs. subop-
timal). Participants were randomly allocated to one of
the four design cells: Finnish-optimal, Finnish-
Table 4 Bilinguals’ self-reported length of stay in the UK and age of L2 acquisition (means and SDs in years), broken down by
condition for Experiment 2
Finnish (L1) English (L2)
Optimal Suboptimal Optimal Suboptimal
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Length of stay 9.39 8.88 8.94 9.28 8.34 7.60 11.83 11.24
AoA 9.17 1.58 9.20 1.39 9.00 1.08 9.44 2.04
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suboptimal, English-optimal, or English-suboptimal.
Each participant read only one vignette.
Both studies were conducted online, and each
participant was sent a link to complete the experiment.
Bilingual participants were first asked to fill out a short
questionnaire assessing linguistic background and
English (L2) proficiency. Native English speakers
skipped this step. Participants were then asked to read
vignette allocated to them, followed by the five-item
blame questionnaire (choosing appropriate scale-
points via mouse click). After the blame items,
participants were asked to answer the three compre-
hension questions about the vignette. All participants
were then fully debriefed via a debriefing page. The
procedure took less than 10 min to complete.
Ethics
The experiment was carried out in full compliance of
the BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct (2018) and
approved by the University of Glasgow College of
Science and Engineering Ethics Committee.
Results
Power
Power analyses were conducted prior to recruitment of
participants, using the PANGEA application (http://
jakewestfall.org/pangea/). The analyses suggested
that, assuming a conventional ‘medium’ effect size,
120 participants were needed to achieve 69% power,
and 160 to achieve 80% power. This suggests that the
final samples for Study 1 (N = 119) and Study 2
(N = 211) were reasonably sensitive to the effects of
interest, although imbalances in the design (due to
participant exclusion) could lower the actual power
figures relative to the ‘idealised’ calculations reported
here.
Blame scores
We combined rating responses to the first four items of
the blame questionnaire (covering blame, responsi-
bility, punishment, and seriously wrong) into a single
blame composite score by summing them up. Since
participants gave scores from 1 to 9 on the Likert
scales, blame composite scores ranged from 4 (low
blame) to 36 (high blame). This was treated as a
continuous variable in subsequent analyses. Reliabil-
ity analyses based on the R package psych (Revelle
2018) confirmed excellent internal consistency of the
4-item composite scale, with 95% CIs for Cronbach’s
alpha of [0.923, 0.959] in Experiment 1 and [0.930,
0.957] in Experiment 2 (established via bootstrapping
over 10,000 resamples per study).
Experiment 1
Table 5 shows means and SDs of the blame composite
scores in each participant group and condition and the
violin plot in Fig. 1 provides corresponding distribu-
tional information. Participants in the optimal condi-
tion gave lower blame scores than those in the
suboptimal condition. Moreover, bilinguals (perform-
ing the task in L2) tended to attribute more blame than
native speakers (performing the task in L1) regardless
of condition.
A 2 9 2 between-subjects ANOVA was performed
to test the effects of Group and Optimality on blame
attribution. Overall, participants in the optimal condi-
tion attributed less blame than those in the suboptimal
condition, resulting in a strong main effect of
Optimality [F(1115) = 165.773, p\ 0.001,
g2 = 0.577]. A significant effect of Group was also
found [F(1115) = 5.934, p = 0.016, g2 = 0.021], con-
firming that the bilingual group gave reliably higher
blame scores than the native group. The expected
interaction between the two predictors was not con-
firmed [F\ 1]. The optimality bias in Experiment 1
was therefore not mitigated by the FLE.
Table 5 Means and SDs for blame attribution scores across
participant group and optimality condition in Experiment 1
Group Condition Overall
Optimal Suboptimal
M SD M SD M SD
Bilingual (L2) 11.67 7.23 24.96 6.23 17.84 9.48
Native (L1) 8.56 4.35 22.96 5.47 14.73 8.65
Overall 9.97 6.00 23.94 5.88
123
J Cult Cogn Sci
Experiment 2
Descriptive data for Experiment 2 are provided in
Table 6 and Fig. 2 below. Again, participants gave
clearly higher blame scores in the suboptimal than in
the optimal condition. In contrast to Experiment 1,
overall blame scores were comparable across L2 vs.
L1 conditions. Also note that optimality condition
differences in the means were in the opposite direction
to the expected FLE: For English (L2), the subopti-
mal-optimal contrast amounted to 23.46 - 8.73 =
14.73 blame-score units, and for Finnish (L1) to
21.75 - 10.65 = 11.10 blame-score units.
A 2 9 2 between-subjects ANOVA confirmed only
one significant effect, namely the main effect of
optimality [F(1207) = 176.748, p\ 0.001,
g2 = 0.456]: participants in the suboptimal condition
gave higher blame scores than those in the optimal
condition.
The main effect of target language was not
significant [F\ 1]. The interaction between optimal-
ity and target language was marginal
[F(1207) = 3.467, p = 0.064, g2 = 0.009] and in the
opposite direction to the expected FLE.
Exploratory analyses
We conducted further analyses to investigate addi-
tional factors that may have affected the blame
judgements. These analyses were not pre-registered,
but are reported for completeness and to inspire future
work.
Judgement confidence
Participants’ confidence scores were measured by item
(5) in the blame questionnaire. Since responses to this
question were measured on a single, discrete but rank-
ordered 9-point Likert scale, we analysed these data
using ordinal logistic regression, as implemented in
the R package ordinal (Christensen 2019).
In Experiment 1, average confidence ratings did not
seem to differ between the optimal (M = 6.39, SD =
2.00) and suboptimal condition (M = 6.30, SD =
1.40). Bilingual speakers (M = 6.14, SD = 1.85)
tended to be slightly less confident overall than native
speakers (M = 6.54, SD = 1.64), but the ordinal
logistic regression analysis actually revealed no reli-
able main effect or interaction effects (all ps[ 0.2).
Ordinal logistic models of the confidence ratings in
Experiment 2 showed a reliable optimality main effect
(b = - 0.562; p = 0.023): irrespective of target lan-
guage condition, participants in the optimal condition
(M = 7.64, SD = 1.87) were more confident in their
judgements than participants in the suboptimal condi-
tion (M = 6.48, SD = 1.85). By contrast, the main
effect of Target Language, as well as the optimal-
ity 9 target language interaction, did not approach
significance in the confidence ratings (ps[ 0.4).
Fig. 1 Blame scores by group and optimality condition
Table 6 Means and SDs for blame attribution scores across
participant group and optimality condition in Study 2
Language Condition Overall
Optimal Suboptimal
M SD M SD M SD
English (L2) 8.73 4.48 23.46 7.67 16.50 9.73
Finnish (L1) 10.65 7.90 21.75 7.58 16.57 9.49
Overall 9.66 6.41 22.62 7.64
Fig. 2 Blame scores by target language and optimality
condition
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Third comprehension question
As explained earlier, participants had to answer the
first two comprehension questions correctly to be
included in the main analyses. The third comprehen-
sion question (‘‘Did the doctor have any way of
knowing that this belief about the probabilities was
false or was it outside her control?’’) actually turned
out to be somewhat problematic. In Experiment 1, 70
participants unexpectedly answered this question with
‘‘yes’’; only 47 said ‘‘no’’ (as expected), and another
two participants skipped this question altogether.
Therefore, most participants (58%) answered this
question in an unexpected manner. In Experiment 2,
82 participants unexpectedly answered ‘‘yes’’, com-
pared to 128 ‘‘no’’ responses and one participant
skipping the question. While more in line with our
expectations, the proportion of participants giving the
‘wrong’ answer was still quite large in Experiment 2
(38%).
Binary logistic regression analyses were conducted
to explore whether there would be any cross-condition
differences in answering the third comprehension
question correctly. No clear main effects or interac-
tions were established in either of the two studies (all
ps[ 0.2). Hence, answering the third comprehension
question correctly was unlikely to be predictive of the
blame attribution scores of the main analyses.
Length of stay and age of acquisition
as a predictors
As suggested in Tables 3 and 4 above, there were
slight imbalances in length of stay in an English
speaking country and in age of acquisition of English
across the bilingual samples per condition. We
therefore conducted additional multiple regression
analyses in order to assess were these two variables
were predictive of the observed blame ratings.
For Experiment 1, only bilingual participant data
were considered, as we did not have information about
the age of acquisition or length of stay in English
speaking country for the English native speakers. Age
of acquisition (AoA), Length of Stay (LoS), optimality
condition (Condition), and all possible two-way
interactions between these predictors, were included
in the model as predictors of the blame composite
scores.
As seen in Table 7, the regression model confirmed
the previously established main effect of Condition
even when variation in Length of Stay and AoA was
accounted for: the reliably negative estimate for
Condition shows that blame judgments were harsher
in the suboptimal condition. Interestingly, Age of
Acquisition of English also had a significant effect;
earlier acquisition of English predicted harsher blame
judgments. There was also an interaction between
Length of Stay and Age of Acquisition, suggesting that
the effect of AoA was mitigated by LoS to some
extent.
For Experiment 2, Age of Acquisition (AoA),
Length of Stay (LoS), optimality condition (Condi-
tion), and test language (Language) were entered into
the model as predictors of the composite blame
judgments. We also included the two-way interactions
between each of the predictors.
As Table 8 shows, only the effect of optimality
condition was significant (as in the pre-registered main
analysis). The interaction between Condition and
Language was marginal (p = 0.06) and it should be
noted that its direction suggested the opposite pattern
to the hypothesised FLE (same as in the pre-registered
main analysis).
Discussion
In line with De Freitas and Johnson (2018), we
expected blame scores to be lower in the optimal
condition than in the suboptimal condition. Both
studies fully supported this hypothesis, showing clear
evidence for an optimality bias in blame attribution.
We also hypothesised that there would be an interac-
tion between Language/Group and Condition, such
that the difference in blame judgments between the
two conditions (optimal vs. suboptimal) would be
smaller in L2 than in L1. This hypothesis was clearly
not supported. In Experiment 1, L2 speakers were
found to provide reliably higher blame attribution
scores than L1 speakers, regardless of condition. In
Experiment 2, no reliable difference between language
conditions was found; if anything, there was a
marginal interaction suggesting that the optimality
bias in blame judgements was actually somewhat
higher in L2 than in L1. In other words, the optimality
bias in blame attribution did not appear to be
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modulated by a Foreign Language Effect (FLE)—or at
least not in the direction we originally hypothesised.
Interestingly, in the exploratory analyses, we found
lower age of L2 acquisition to be predictive of higher
blame scores, and this effect to be mitigated the longer
the participants have stayed in an English-speaking
country. Although this pattern was found only in
Experiment 1 (bilinguals from various L1 back-
grounds) and not in Experiment 2 (Finnish L2
speakers of English), this may point to the importance
of controlling for these variables more carefully in
future research on this topic. In Experiment 2, the
Finnish participants completing the study in English
varied in duration of residence in the UK from a
minimum of 3 months to a maximum of 50 years
(average 10 years). In comparison, bilinguals in Study
1 only ranged in duration of residence from 2 months
to 17 years (average 5 years).
The processes of blame attribution
In both experiments, the hypothetical actor faced
significantly more blame for the same tragic outcome
when they (unknowingly) made a suboptimal rather
than an optimal choice. Thus, we replicated the
findings from De Freitas and Johnson (2018), and
found an optimality bias in blame attribution. Findings
such as these are consistent with the person-as-
reconstructor theory of blame attribution (Kahneman
and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Miller 1986).
According to this theory, tragic outcomes motivate
observers to reconstruct events after they happen,
considering alternative choices and blaming the agent
for failing to act otherwise. The doctor in our vignettes
had three choices, which means that they could have
acted differently. As a result, we observed higher
blame judgements in the suboptimal condition.
This may also be explained by the Path Model of
Blame (Guglielmo and Malle 2017), which argues that
blame is assigned systematically. Once causality is
determined, observers assess whether the action was
intentional. If the action was unintentional, observers
then assess preventability. Our vignette was based on
an unintentional scenario, so according to the theory,
degree of preventability should guide blame judge-
ments. In the optimal condition, the outcome was
clearly not preventable because the patient suffers
hearing loss even when the doctor picks the ‘best’
Table 7 Regression




Predictor b b 95% CI sr2 sr2 95% CI Fit (R2)
(Intercept) 31.13** [21.92, 40.34]
LoS - 1.13 [- 2.45, 0.19] 0.02 [- 0.03, 0.07]
Condition - 15.72** [- 26.64, - 4.80] 0.06 [- 0.02, 0.15]
AoA - 1.63** [- 2.63, - 0.63] 0.08 [- 0.01, 0.18] 0.621**
LoS:condition - 0.88 [- 1.76, 0.00] 0.03 [- 0.03, 0.09]
LoS:AoA 0.16* [0.03, 0.29] 0.05 [- 0.02, 0.12]
Condition:AoA 0.65 [- 0.51, 1.81] 0.01 [- 0.02, 0.04]
Table 8 Regression
table for Experiment 2:
Finnish speakers tested in
Finnish or English
*Indicates p\ 0.05
Predictor b b 95% CI sr2 sr2 95% CI Fit (R2)
(Intercept) 17.40** [8.81, 26.00]
LoS - 0.25 [- 0.73, 0.23] 0.00 [- 0.01, 0.01]
AoA - 0.05 [- 0.98, 0.87] 0.00 [- 0.00, 0.00]
Condition - 14.83* [- 28.25, - 1.40] 0.01 [- 0.01, 0.03]
Language - 3.55 [- 15.93, 8.82] 0.00 [- 0.00, 0.01]
LoS:AoA 0.02 [- 0.02, 0.07] 0.00 [- 0.01, 0.01] 0.479**
LoS:condition - 0.21 [- 0.44, 0.03] 0.01 [- 0.01, 0.03]
AoA:condition 0.42 [- 1.06, 1.91] 0.00 [- 0.00, 0.01]
AoA:language 0.39 [- 0.94, 1.72] 0.00 [- 0.00, 0.01]
Condition:language 3.73 [- 0.16, 7.62] 0.01 [- 0.01, 0.03]
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treatment option. In the suboptimal condition, how-
ever, it is likely that participants believed the outcome
could have been prevented, had the doctor chosen the
‘better’ treatment. Thus, participants in the suboptimal
condition seemingly based their judgments on poten-
tial alternative outcomes, while ignoring the doctor’s
mental state. Interestingly, exploratory analysis
showed that in Experiment 2, participants in the
optimal condition reported significantly more confi-
dence in their judgement than those in the suboptimal
condition, which could be seen as support for this kind
of explanation.
Cushman (2008) argues that moral judgements
involve two processes. The first one is triggered by
negative consequences, where we search for an agent
who is causally responsible. The second process is
determined by analysing mental states, where blame is
assigned only if the agent believed the action would
cause harm. In this model, causality and foreseeability
are separate processes, so causation and blame should
not become conflated in moral judgements. However,
our findings suggest that observers often make this
mistake. Participants did not appear to engage in the
second process when forming their moral judgements,
i.e., they ignored the actor’s viewpoint and beliefs.
This contradicts the idea of two separate processes, or
alternatively, suggests that the second process was
given little consideration by participants: while the
hypothetical doctor was causally responsible for her
patient’s hearing loss, analysing her mental state
should have resulted in equal blame judgements across
conditions, which was clearly not what the data
showed.
The FLE in blame attribution
De Freitas and Johnson (2018) argue that factors
inhibiting participants from considering the actor’s
mental state should enhance the optimality bias in
blame attribution. Based on this assumption, and
considering that emotionality might play a role in
inhibiting the adoption of the actor’s viewpoint, our
second hypothesis was that the optimality bias in
blame attribution should be stronger in L1 than in L2,
particularly because previous demonstrations of the
Foreign Language Effect (FLE) have pointed to
reduced emotionality in L2.
In Experiment 1, we found that using L2 did not
facilitate participants to think ‘more rationally’ about
the actor’s actual beliefs. Rather, L2 speakers appor-
tioned generally more blame than L1 speakers. In
Experiment 2, we found a marginal interaction in the
opposite direction to our expectations, i.e., the opti-
mality bias in blame judgements was slightly stronger
in L2 than in L1. How can these unexpected results be
reconciled with previous findings on the FLE?
It is possible that the FLE, by reducing emotion-
ality, promotes consequentialist, utilitarian moral
judgements. When using a foreign language, people
become less sensitive to intentions and beliefs and
more sensitive to outcomes (see also Hayakawa et al.
2016). Previous research on the FLE in moral
judgement has indeed been confined to dilemmas
involving utilitarian decision-making, i.e. the ‘trolley’
and ‘footbridge’ dilemma (Cipolletti et al. 2015;
Corey et al. 2017; Costa et al. 2014a; Geipel et al.
2015). The present study is novel in applying FLE to
the attribution domain, which involves judging the
intentions and actions of another person.
We conjecture that emotional involvement—in the
sense of enhanced empathy (discussed below)—may
actually be a requirement for considering a situation
from another person’s perspective. Under this view,
diminishing emotion (e.g., via the FLE) might enhance
the optimality bias in blame attribution, and thus
partially account for the findings in both Experiment 1
(where bilinguals were found to be harsher in their
blame judgments than L1 speakers) and Experiment 2
(where the optimality bias was found to be slightly
stronger in L2 than in L1).
Masto (2015) argues that empathy is a crucial
aspect in the forming of moral judgements. It is not
enough to just observe an actor’s behaviour to assess
whether it is morally right, but we must also make
additional evaluations regarding the motivations and
thought-processes of others. Previous research sug-
gests that considering an action from the perpetrator’s
point of view can indeed reduce the severity of blame
judgements. For example, in a mock-trial paradigm,
Haegerich and Bottoms (2000) presented participants
with a patricide scenario where a hypothetical child
defendant claimed to have committed the crime in
self-defence following years of abuse. Participants in
the experimental condition were instructed to take the
perspective of this child, and imagine how they would
feel and think in the same situation. This resulted in
significantly lower blame judgements compared to a
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control group where no such instructions were
provided.
Encouraging observers to think from the actor’s
perspective would likely also mitigate the optimality
bias by directing focus away from the existence of
alternative options and towards the key fact that these
options are redundant (because the actor is not aware
of their importance). Increased perspective-taking and
empathy towards the ‘doctor’ in our vignettes may
make participants realise that the outcome was not
preventable.
Some research suggests that bilinguals may actu-
ally have advanced executive functions that are
advantageous for perspective-taking (e.g., Greenberg
et al. 2013). However, this has primarily been
demonstrated for early bilinguals, especially those
with native-like proficiency in both languages (see
Rubio-Ferna´ndez 2017). The purported bilingual
advantage may actually not exist in late bilinguals
with L2 as foreign language. For example, Ryskin
et al. (2014) studied visuospatial perspective-taking in
a paradigm where participants completed a route-
finding task by following instructions from an exper-
imenter who had either the same or the opposite
perspective. Late bilinguals struggled significantly
more than monolinguals when taking opposite per-
spectives in their L2. Indeed, both of our experiments
focused on late bilinguals, i.e. we deliberately
excluded a relatively small number of bilingual
participants who might have benefited from (poten-
tially) enhanced executive functioning.
Mante-Estacio and Bernardo (2015) found a bilin-
gual disadvantage in a Theory of Mind task where
they asked participants to take the perspective of a
character in a vignette. They studied the ‘illusory
transparency of intention’—originally demonstrated
by Keysar (1994)—whereby readers falsely assume
that characters in a story have access to the same
information as the reader does. Participants were given
vignettes describing a conversation and asked to judge
whether the tone of a statement was sarcastic or
genuine from the perspective of the character in the
vignette. It was found that participants in L2 were
more likely to focus on information that was clearly
not available to the described character. Thus, these
participants had more pronounced ‘illusory trans-
parency of intention’ and found it more difficult to take
the character’s perspective in their foreign language.
Muted emotional resonance can also reduce the
vividness of mental imagery. This was demonstrated
by Hayakawa and Keysar (2018) on several measures.
Bilingual participants reported experiencing difficulty
in imagining objects in their L2. The same trend
appeared also in a number of objective tasks. Partic-
ipants were asked to mentally categorise objects based
on visual attributes like shape. Bilinguals completing
the task in their second language were less accurate
than those completing the task in their native lan-
guage. Importantly, Hayakawa and Keysar (2018) also
found that bilingual participants completing the task in
their L2 were more likely to agree to pushing a man in
front of a train in the ‘footbridge dilemma’ and found
that these participants rated the scenario as being far
less visually vivid than those in L1.
As a whole, the present studies tap into a relatively
new area of research. Few studies so far have
investigated potential links between bilingualism and
perspective-taking, and whether using a foreign lan-
guage makes it difficult to imagine or consider the
thoughts and feelings of others. The present research
can make only tentative conclusions in this regard. In
Experiment 1, L2 participants attributed significantly
more blame than L1 participants, regardless of con-
dition. In Experiment 2, the marginal interaction
between language and condition suggested that L2
participants were somewhat more susceptible to the
optimality bias in blame attribution than L1 partici-
pants. Together, these results could be accounted for
by assuming decreased empathy (or perspective-
taking ability) as a result of reduced emotional
resonance in L2.
Finally, a potential issue arose from the third
comprehension question in our experiments, which
was also included in the original De Freitas and
Johnson (2018) study: ‘‘Did the doctor have any way
of knowing this belief about the probabilities was false
or was it outside her control?’’ This question was
answered incorrectly by a large proportion of partic-
ipants (58% in Experiment 1 and 38% in Experiment
2) and could therefore not be used as an exclusion
criterion. Participants were possibly thinking beyond
what was stated in the narrative, and assumed that the
doctor must have been careless in her prior research
for having insufficient knowledge about the treat-
ments’ differing efficacies. That said, the exploratory
analyses showed no systematic effects of language or
condition in the likelihoods of answering this question
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incorrectly. Thus, answering this question incorrectly
did not appear to be associated with participants’
blame attributions.
Conclusion
The present experiments provide further evidence for
the existence of an optimality bias in moral judge-
ments. As such, they add to the existing literature on
blame attribution and related theories. People find the
existence of ‘better’ options important when morally
judging the choices made by others, even when (a) all
choices lead to the same (negative) outcome and
(b) decision-makers are described as believing that all
choices are equally optimal. More specifically, par-
ticipants apportion reliably more blame (for the same
negative outcome) when a described actor unknow-
ingly made a suboptimal rather than an optimal choice.
Against our expectations, we found that this optimality
bias in blame attribution may be further enhanced by
impaired perspective-taking, or empathy, in one’s
second language (L2). This contributes to the literature
by suggesting that the Foreign Language Effect does
not necessarily put bilinguals at an advantage in all
types of moral decision-making scenarios. Indeed,
there appear to be cases where reduced emotional
resonance in L2 could potentially enhance irrational
biases in moral judgement rather than diminish them.
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Appendix A
Language background questionnaire for bilingual
participants
Are you a native English speaker who does not
speak another language on a daily basis? If YES, you
can skip the other questions on this page (YES/NO)
At what age did you start learning English?
Are either of you parents native speakers of
English?
How long have you lived in the UK?
(cumulative, please give your answer in years and
months)
Have you lived in another English-speaking
country?
(if YES, give your answer in years and months, if
not, type 0)
How long have you studied in the UK?
(give your answer in years and months; if you
haven’t studied in the UK, type 0)
How proficient are you in READING in English?
(1–7 rating)
How proficient are you in WRITING in English?
(1–7 rating)
How proficient are you in SPEAKING in English?
(1–7 rating)
Please leave any comments about your language




Blame items (1–9 ratings)
1. To what extent does the doctor deserve blame for
their patient’s hearing loss?
2. How responsible is the doctor for the patient’s
hearing loss?
3. To what extent does the doctor deserve to be
punished for her actions?
4. How seriously wrong were the doctor’s actions?




J Cult Cogn Sci
1. TRUE or FALSE: the doctor believed that both
treatments had a 70% chance of leading to
recovery.
2. Given the treatment that the doctor chose, what
was the actual chance of that treatment leading to
recovery?
3. Did the doctor have any way of knowing that this
belief about the probabilities was false, or was it
outside her control? (Response options: ‘‘YES,
there was evidence saying that her belief was
incorrect’’ or ‘‘NO, it was outside her control’’.)
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